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POLICE POWER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
J. L. CLENDENNING0
L Introduction
Any consideration of the practical problems involved in adminis-
tering criminal law must, of necessity, take into account the conflict
between police power on the one hand and maintenance of civil
liberties on the other.
The purpose of this paper is not to define the dividing line between
these two concepts. I hope it is not a presentation of a subjective, pre-
judicial point of view. One's past experience will perhaps place
limitations on a completely objective expression of opinion: a lawyer
will generally regard a problem from a strictly legal viewpoint; a
police officer would regard it from a law enforcement angle. As an
ex-police officer, and presently a law student, I will attempt to outline
some of the problems that present themselves where these two view-
points are in conflict. Consequently, the conflict between civil liberties
and police power occupies the focal point of this article.
The following illustration was chosen from my past experience
as a police officer because it embraces many of the problems referred
to later in the article. It should be pointed out that this took place
approximately fifteen years ago, yet, conversations with police officers
have led me to conclude that such a situation is not unrepresentative
of contemporary problems.
During the winter months a report was received from a service
club that a camp which they operated during the summer had been
seriously damaged by vandals. Since the camp was used for the bene-
fit of underprivileged children from across Ontario, considerable
publicity was given in the local newspaper to its destruction. This
naturally resulted in pressure on the police department to find the
guilty parties.
The camp was located in a remote area, perhaps three miles from
the nearest resident. The vandalism had occurred approximately two
months prior to discovery; thus, any potential evidence, such as tracks
of the vandals, had been erased. After a complete and exhaustive
examination of the scene, not one shred of evidence was found which
might direct our paths to the guilty parties.
Several weeks passed but because of the unfavourable publicity
surrounding the offence it was far from forgotten. Virtually all
avenues of enquiry had ended with negative results. Then a break
came in the investigation. One of the officers in the detachment was
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informed' by a youth that he had seen some boys-two of whom
he knew by name-hunting in the vicinity at approximately the time
of the commission of the offence. The youths were aged seventeen
and fifteen.
In company with another officer, I went to the older boy's home.
On our arrival, the youth appeared extremely nervous. This could
have been the result of natural apprehension of police in general, or
indicative of his guilt. We (and I venture most police officers would),
construed this as the latter, or perhaps more fittingly, we chose to
regard it so. We then requested the youth to accompany us to the
police office, intimating to him that we would like to ask him some
questions. There was no indication to him at this point as to the
subject of the questions, and he acceded to our request. I must confess
that if the youth had refused to go with us, we probably would have
taken him anyway.
On arriving at the police office, I subjected the youth to intensive
questioning. There is a set pattern in such approach. The questioner
adopts a 'hard line' towards the suspect; cross-examining him on
every inconsistency. Occasionally the suspect will break down and
give a statement. More frequently, however, he slowly becomes more
and more antagonistic towards the questioner. The suspect's original
story that he had been hunting in the area was repeated time after
time. Finally, after approximately one hour of intensive questioning,
the youth became so antagonistic that he refused to say anything.
During this period, I felt certain, because of the youth's attitude,
that he knew a lot more than he was disclosing. My feelings in this
respect were probably based simply on intuition because there was
not one single fact that lent credence to his guilt.
During the foregoing period, by prior arrangement, the fifteen-
year-old lad had been brought to the office. Also by arrangement, he
had been seated on a chair facing the door to the office where the
questioning of the seventeen-year-old was proceeding. When the door
to that office was opened, both youths would be visible to one another.
At this point, a psychologist could better give the reasons for
what was about to transpire. I left the office where the questioning was
being conducted, advising the youth I would return in a moment.
Actually, I had no intention to return; from this point on the ques-
tioning would be conducted by someone else. Who was to be the
replacement? The officer in charge of the detachment was the per-
sonification of the 'father image'. His corpulence, prematurely grey
hair, clear plastic-rimmed glasses, all added up to a picture of a person
sympathetic to one's cause, particularly a seventeen-year-old who
1 The writer was informed by police officers interviewed that current
criticisms of the police have not slowed down the amount of information
provided by informants. Although one segment of the community may become
sufficiently alienated from the police for various reasons to stop providing
information, they are generally replaced by another segment.
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had been subjected to such intensive questioning. This was our
choice of a replacement. 2
I cannot testify as to what transpired in this particular case, not
having been present, but the procedure probably conformed to past
experience in similar situations. The questioner attempts to gain the
confidence of the suspect. In doing so, he probably denounced the
earlier officer as being arrogant, inhuman, a bully, and used any
other deprecatory description he felt suited the particular circum-
stances. It must be kept in mind that the suspect by now was aware
of the other youth's presence in the outer office. In the circumstances,
it requires only a few subtle references to another confession, a
suggestion that it would be 'better' for the suspect to confess (leaving
it open to the suspect to place his own interpretation on what 'better'
means in this context), and a few sympathetic gestures to effect
results.
In approximately fifteen minutes, the officer came out of the
room and said the youth was willing to give a full statement. Natural-
ly, because my presence would only cause a return of antagonism,
I was excluded from the taking of such confession.3
Once this statement was obtained, four other boys also confessed
to the vandalism. Their ages ranged from thirteen to sixteen. Two
weeks later they all appeared in Magistrate's Court and were placed
on suspended sentence for one year. Because most of the families
were of low income, none of the boys was represented by counsel at
the hearing.
Proponents of civil liberties could attack this procedure on many
grounds. The manner in which the boys were picked up could be said
to constitute arrest without reasonable and probable grounds. The
manner in which the confession was obtained is open to attack
because the suspect had no opportunity to avail himself of legal advice.
These are only some grounds for attack and are from a strict view-
point of civil liberties perfectly justified.
On the other hand, many people, and I do not refer only to police,
would say that the action taken was perfectly justified even though
somewhat colourable tactics were employed to obtain the confession.
Their argument in support of this contention would follow the line
that without the confession the guilty parties would not have been
apprehended. Apprehension in the circumstances was necessary in
view of the gravity of the offence. This argument appears to be as
acceptable as that put forward on behalf of civil liberties.
2 The selection of the officer who will take over the questioning will
depend upon the first officer's appraisal of which type would most likely elicit
response from the accused. In this situation, the officer in charge appeared
the most likely to effect the results desired. The only limitation here is the
variety of personality types actually available.
3 This procedure could be verified quite simply by considering the number
of criminal cases in which a statement is involved. Generally, the arresting
officer is not the person taking the statement.
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Fifteen years ago, no civil liberties objections were expressed, at
least not to my knowledge. If the same factual situation were to
present itself today, the reverse would probably hold true. What is
the reason for such a change in attitude after a short effiuxion of
time? The liberty of the citizen has been so curtailed in matters of
employment, choice of residence and other aspects of every day living
because of social and economic factors that preservation of what
freedom actually remains in our democratic society has come to be
jealously guarded. The police officer is a constant, visual reminder
of restrictions on our freedom; consequently, he frequently receives
the brunt of our attack. This, I add, is my own opinion of the reasons
underlying our emphasis on civil liberties today.
Assuming that preservation of civil liberties is a justifiable pur-
suit, to what extent should we pursue this ideal?
The protection of the individual from oppression and abuse is a major
interest in a free society; but so is the effective prosecution of crime, an
interest which at times seems forgotten.4
A balance between the two concepts must be struck. It is with
this balance in mind that the practical problems of police administra-
tion will be considered. Part II will consider the peculiar status of
a police officer. Part I will deal with arrests without a warrant with
particular emphasis on a person's right to refuse to identify himself.
Part IV is a consideration of applying in practice the legal concepts
outlined in the two preceding Parts. Finally, Part V concludes with
opinions as to what changes could be made in this area of the law.
I1. Status and Duties of a Police Officer
The peculiar status of a police officer is anachronistic in present
day society. Subject to certain qualifications, a person employed by
another is considered an agent of the employer. A police officer, how-
ever, is not an employee in the traditional sense. This was well
illustrated in the recent case R. v. Labour Relations Board, ex parte
Fredericton5 which raised the issue whether a police organization
could be certified as bargaining agent. Michaud C.J.Q.B. succinctly
described their peculiar status:
Under the common law, the position of constables or police officers is that
they are holders of office of trust under the Crown, whose primary pur-
pose is to exercise the rights and discharge the duties conferred or
imposed upon the holders of that office by the common or statutory law.
From this has been established the rule that they are not servants or
agents of the appointing municipality for whose wrongful acts the
municipality is or may be liable at law; but are offlicers appointed to
perform duties of an executive character in the general administration of
justice.6
This status is a product of historical development. Originally it
was the responsibility of all citizens to co-operate in the arrest and
4 In re Fried et al. (1947), 161 F. (2d) 453. The passage and citation were
taken from Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures, 1963, p. 5.
5 (1956), 38 M.P.R. 26.
6 Ibid., at p. 39.
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apprehension of criminals. If a criminal was discovered by the in-
habitants of a vill or hundred, it was the duty of the citizens to set
up a 'hue and cry' and chase him until he was apprehended either in
the citizens' own jurisdiction or up to seven miles into the adjoining
one.7 Beyond this point it became the duty of the citizenry of the
neighbouring vill to apprehend the criminal. Thirteenth century sta-
tutes systematized the police powers of the vill; watchmen were to
be kept throughout the night and the assize of arms enforced; in 1252
constables were to be appointed.8 Not until Sir Robert Peel's Police
Improvement Act in 1829, by which the first Metropolitan Police
Force was organized, were there any serious attempts to organize
police forces along modern lines.9 Thus, because of this historical
development, the maintenance of the public peace has been an obliga-
tion on the populace as a whole. In performing his duties, a police
officer is simply a citizen, discharging civilian duties. His authority
is original, not delegated, and therefore, he is not an agent of the
municipality.
Much of the law of agency was developed in an industrial environ-
ment after the advent of the Industrial Revolution and the creation
of employer-employee relationship. The maintenance of public peace
reaches back in time to the very beginnings of our society, and be-
cause of this earlier development, has escaped the application of the
agency concept.
The main problem created by this historical anomaly is that
when an individual officer has engaged in tortious activity, he alone
is personally liable for any damages. In Ontario, this rule has recently
been altered by statute.10 The effect of these changes is to make the
Chief Constable liable for the torts of the members of the police force
under his direction, committed on or after January 1, 1966, and the
Municipality shall pay any damages or costs awarded against him in
such action.
Are there merits in this provision? The writer feels there are"
for the following reasons. Police protection is a benefit accruing to
the community at large and it is only just that the costs should be
borne by the persons receiving the benefits. Secondly, many police
7 Stephen's History of the Criminal Law (1883), Vol. 1. Although this
duty can be traced as far back as the beginning of the thirteenth century,
its counterpart can be discovered in even more recent times. Until 1955,
with the amendment of the Criminal Code, a warrant for arrest could be
executed wherever the accused was found in the territorial jurisdiction of the
justice issuing the warrant, or in the case of fresh pursuit, at any place In
an adjoining territorial division within seven miles of the border of the first
mentioned jurisdiction. See R.S.C. 1927, c. 36, s. 661.
8 Theodore Pluncknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed.,
1956), p. 86.
9 There had previously been a few isolated attempts at organization such
as the Bow Street Runners in 1753.
10 The Police Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 298. Section 22 to 24 inclusive were
repealed and sections 22 and 23 substituted therefore by S.O. 1965, c. 99,
s. 6(1).
11 Subject to comments which are expressed in the conclusion, infra.
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officers (and this is substantiated in conversations with police them-
selves) are virtually judgment-proof. If the claimant in a tort action
were restricted to the individual as a source of satisfaction, in many
instances his claim would be frustrated. Thirdly, the provisions
place a responsibility not only on municipalities but also on chief
constables, to ensure that members of their forces do not exceed their
legal rights and duties.
The latter is perhaps one of the principal benefits of the provision.
As in an ordinary agency situation, the principals want to ensure
that only those persons best qualified to represent them will be chosen.
Perhaps the normal requirements of height, weight and a letter from
the candidate's home town politician will be traversed and selection
made strictly on the basis of ability.
Other than this statutory change, the status of a constable re-
mains virtually unaltered; he is no more than a citizen with brass
buttons.'
2
Throughout this Part, reference has been made to the police
officer's duty of maintenance of the public peace. This terminology
is rather vague; however, a fairly comprehensive outline of police
duties is set out in The Police Act of Ontario:'
3
The members of police forces appointed under Part II are charged with
the duty of preserving the peace, preventing robberies and other crimes
and offences, including offences against the by-laws of the municipality,
and apprehending offenders, and laying informations before the proper
tribunal, and prosecuting and aiding in the prosecution of offenders, and
have generally all the powers and privileges and are liable to all the
duties and responsibilities that belong to constables.
The scope of this paper does not permit a comprehensive analysis
of the problem of public relations but a brief comment may suffice to
place it in proper perspective. Public estimation of police is directly
related to the need for police services; the greater the need, the
greater the esteem accorded. It also depends on what side of this
'cops and robbers' game you happen to be. If you need their services,
you address them as 'sir'. If you think they will discover you breaking
the law, you call them 'fuzz'. Unfortunately, because of the advent
and increasing popularity of the automobile, more and more of the
general public are falling within the latter category.
III. Arrest and Other Related Problems
A police officer's power to arrest is closely associated with his
status. As previously indicated, his rights and duties are co-terminus
with those of an ordinary citizen unless expressly altered by statute.
The Criminal Code now defines the ordinary citizen's power to arrest.
12 Statutory extensions of a police officer's powers over and above those
derived from his status will be considered in the next Part which deals
with his power to arrest.
13 R.S.O. 1960, c. 298, s. 47. Police Forces appointed under Part II relate
to those appointed by municipalities. The Ontario Provincial Police Powers
are set out in s. 3.
1966]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Anyone may arrest without a warrant a person whom he finds com-
mitting an indictable offence 14 or, whom, on reasonable and probable
grounds he believes has committed a criminal offence and is escaping
from and freshly pursued by persons who have lawful authority to
arrest that person. 15 This power to arrest without a warrant is essen-
tially the common law power to arrest expressed in statutory form,
and merely an extension of the mediaeval concept of 'hue and cry'.
The normal power to arrest has been extended in the case of a
police officer. The Criminal Code17 provides:
A peace officer may arrest without a warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable offence or who, on reason-
able and probable grounds, he believes has committed or is about to
commit an indictable offence or is about to commit suicide, or
(b) a person, whom he finds committing a criminal offence.
The section is drafted so that arrests without a warrant can be
effected when a peace officer finds a person committing either an
indictable offence or an offence punishable on summary conviction, 18
or, where, on reasonable and probable grounds he believes the person
has, or is about to, commit an indictable offence.
Most of the problems in this area arise in determining what are
reasonable and probable grounds. To illustrate the problem from a
practical viewpoint, suppose a police officer comes upon a person in a
lane at the rear of a jewellery store late at night. Several inter-
pretations can be placed on his presence: he is 'about to' break into
the store; he is taking a short cut; or perhaps he is simply there
because of physical necessity combined with a bashful disposition.
Mere suspicion is not enough in the circumstances to warrant an
arrest.
In order to justify an arrest on reasonable and probable grounds it is
necessary to prove a state of facts which would lead a man of ordinary
care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion
that the person is guilty of an offence.19
Suppose the person in the illustration above, begins to walk
away without giving any explanation of his presence to the police
officer. The officer is faced with the necessity to make an instan-
taneous decision. If he orders the person to stop and the latter believes
the officer is about to arrest him, depending upon the circumstances,
this could constitute an arrest. If it were so held, and the suspect had
14 Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 434.
15 Ibid., s. 436.
16 Only arrests without a warrant will be considered in this paper. When
making an arrest with a warrant, the police officer is acting as an agent of
the court in giving effect to the warrant and seldom do problems present
themselves, except, perhaps, in the physical execution of such warrant.
17 Supra, footnote 14, s. 435.
18. In Plested v. MacLeod (1910), 15 W.L.R. 533 criminal offence was
interpreted to include an offence punishable on summary conviction.
19 Leon Yankwich, The Nature of our Freedom, (1949), p. 179. The
quotation and citations were taken from Law Society of Upper Canada Special
Lectures, 1963, p. 22.
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a rational explanation for his presence in the lane, the officer is
exposing himself to civil action for false arrest.
This simple illustration points out the difficulties which arise in
practice in attempting to define what constitutes 'reasonable and
probable grounds' that a person is 'about to' commit an offence. What
action the officer would probably take will be discussed infra.
20
Further extensions of the power to arrest without a warrant
have been given to police officers by Provincial statutes. Only two
of these will be considered here.
Under The Liquor Control Act,2' any constable or other police
officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person whom he finds com-
mitting an offence against the Act or Regulations. This is one of the
most extensive powers to arrest granted under any Act. In view of
the fact that the Act has been subjected to criticism in the press and
also by individuals as being unrealistic in relation to modern day
drinking habits, and also that many people who so disagree refuse
to abide by the provisions, if police officers felt so inclined, a virtual
tide of arrests could ensue.
The Highway Traffic Act 22 provides a list of offences for which
arrest without a warrant is permitted. There are thirteen offences
in all, only three of which are moving violations. These are careless
driving,23 racing,24 and operating a motor vehicle when the permit
has been suspended.25 The remaining ten offences are mainly con-
cerned with proper permits and licenses for the vehicle and its opera-
tion. It should be noted that failure to produce your operator's
licence is not an arrestable offence. This point will take on added
significance in the discussion which follows.
In conversations with senior officials of the Ontario Provincial
Police, my attention was drawn to a directive issued by the Ontario
Attorney-General's office. 26 The substance of the directive was that
if an operator refused to produce his licence, the only course open
to a police officer was to summons him because it was not an offence
for which arrest without a warrant was permitted. In order to
summons the driver, the officer would then have to obtain his name.
If the person simply did not identify himself, the attempt to charge




21 R.S.O. 1960, c. 217, s. 111.
22 R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 156, ss. 2, as amended by S.O. 1964, c. 38, s. 16.
23 R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, s. 60.
24 Ibid., s. 91.
25 Ibid., s. 26.
26 This directive was also referred to in an article by R. S. MacKay, 5
Crim. Law 294.
27 In 1960, a Toronto newspaper (Toronto Daily Star, June 1, 1960)
reported that magistrate Norman Gianelli in Lambton Mills Court had that
day dismissed a charge of obstructing a police officer by failing to produce
an operator's licence. The case was R. v. Switzer but unfortunately I was
unable to locate any report of the case, nor does it appear to have been a
subject of appeal. With deference to both Magistrate Gianelli and the
Attorney-General's office, I would suggest that both the decision and the
directive are open to question in light of the law as it presently stands.
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At common law it is undisputed there is no duty on a citizen to
identify himself to a police officer. The police officer has no more
right to demand identification of a person than I have. With this
rule the writer is in entire agreement; for it to be otherwise would do
violence to a fundamental requirement of our democratic society.
Whether this concept would also embrace a situation where the
person asked for identification has committed an offence appears
open to question.
The directive issued by the Attorney-General's office appears to
have been based 28 on the decision of Koechlin v. Waugh and Hamil-
ton,29 the facts of which are relatively simple. Two youths were
stopped while walking along the street late at night by the two
defendant officers. The officers later gave as their reason for stopping
them that one of the youths was wearing rubber soled shoes and
because of numerous break-ins in the area, they thought the youths
might be associated with the offences. One youth readily identified
himself. The other refused to do so and a scuffle ensued. Subsequently
the youth was arrested and charged with obstruction. The charge
was dismissed. The action here was for false arrest. In short the
result was that the officers were found liable for damages in respect
of the tort.
In the reasons for judgment, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated
that simply wearing rubber soled shoes did not constitute reasonable
and probable grounds for belief that an offence had been committed;
therefore, arrest was not justified.
As to whether this case is authority for the directive, I cite
Laidlaw J.A.:
We do not criticize the police officers in any way for asking the infant
plaintiff and his companion to identify themselves, but we are satisfied
that when the infant plaintiff, who was entirely innocent of any wrong-
doing, refused to do so, the police officer has no right to use force to
compel him to identify himself.30
It should be noted that Laidlaw J.A. expressly included in his
remarks "who was entirely innocent of any wrong doing". He did
not say, nor can it be read into his reasons, that if the plaintiff had
been guilty of a wrong, the officer still could not compel him to give
his name.
In R. v. Semenuik3' it was held that refusal to unlock the glove
compartment of the accused's automobile to allow the officer to search
for liquor was not obstruction.
28 This was adverted to in MacKay's article, surpra, footnote 26.
29 118 C.C.C. 24.
30 Ibid., at p. 27.
31 111 C.C.C. 370.
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Edwards D.C.J. said:
The accused should not be convicted of obstruction simply because
he had refused to carry out the command of an officer vho had no legal
right to insist upon it being obeyed.
I have never understood that, in the absence of statutory provisions, there
was any legal duty on the part of citizens generally, let alone suspected
persons, to assist police officers in discovering the evidence -upon which to
found a conviction and that by refusing so to do one thereby laid himself
open to a charge of obstruction.32
It should be noted that the learned Justice expressly stated there
was no requirement to provide evidence on which to found a charge.
In this I concur. However, it is one thing to say that, in the absence
of statutory provisions compelling a person to do a positive act, refusal
to do so is not obstruction and a different matter entirely to say
that once an offence has been committed this principle can be invoked
to justify refusal to identify oneself.
The classic case33 on this point is R. v. CarrolP4. The headnote
from the case adequately reflects the judgment.
The accused, in company with three other men, was proceeding
along a highway at an early hour in the morning. The constable
heard them whistling and yelling and he advised them to be quiet and
go home. Three of the party followed his advice. The accused re-
mained. The constable asked him to produce his identification but
accused refused and proceeded on his way. An argument and struggle
followed and accused was charged with obstruction.
Held: Conviction quashed.
1) The constable was clearly under a duty to request the four men
to disperse and keep quiet since there was reasonable cause for
concern that their conduct, including accused's, might result in a
disturbance within the meaning of s. 160 of the Criminal Code.
2) After the three had left the scene, the imminence of a disturbance
substantially diminished. The ensuing conduct of the accused, who
was left alone, could not be considered a disturbance nor likely to
cause one. Under these circumstances accused was not under any
duty to identify himself when requested to do so by the constable,
and the constable had no right to arrest the accused.
The case is not such an authoritative precedent as the number
of times it is relied on by writers might suggest. Porter C.J.O. stated:
It is not necessary to consider here whether there might be in other
circumstances an obligation upon a citizen to identify himself when
requested to so do by a constable.35
32 Ibid., at p. 373.
33 The case is consistently cited as authority for not having to identify
oneself to a police officer.
34 31 C.R. 315.
35 Ibid., at p. 318.
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These cases taken together indicate that the law in this area is
not as clearly defined as the Attorney-General's directive seems to
suggest. The writer suggests the whole matter be considered by the
Court of Appeal at the earliest possible moment.
Would it be open to the court to arrive at a different conclusion
than the directive indicates? The writer suggests it could. To con-
stitute obstruction,3 6 two requirements are necessary: the obstruction
must be wilful, and the officer must be performing his duty.
Considering the latter aspect first, it is clearly within the officer's
duty to lay information before the proper tribunal.37 In Hinchliffe v.
Sheldon38 it was held that obstruction means making it more difficult
for the police to carry out their duties. Refusal to give one's name
in the circumstances outlined in the directive would constitute obstruc-
tion in relation to the officer's duty to lay an information in respect
of the offence of failure to produce the operator's license.
Assuming for a moment that the directive issued by the Attorney-
General's office is correct, what is the necessary result? It would
mean from a practical point of view that enforcement of all by-laws
not subject to arrest without a warrant would depend upon the will-
ingness of the person committing an offence to identify himself. If
every violator of these provisions refused to identify himself, the
police simply could not cope with the problem of identification by
other means.
On the other hand, if arrest under the Criminal Code for obstruc-
tion is open to the officer in these circumstances, the consequences
could be profound. In effect, a person who has broken the law in
respect of the most minor violations would be open to a conviction
for an indictable offence and liable to a penalty of up to two years
imprisonment.
The urgency of the situation is becoming more apparent daily
from the point of view of law enforcement. Already the theory of
the directive is being used to circumvent jay-walking provisions in
the City of Toronto. As one senior police official put it, it is only a
matter of time until the public become aware of the fact that all
non-arrestable offences under the Provincial statutes and municipal
by-laws can be evaded simply by refusing to produce identification.
Unfortunately the law in this area produces peculiar results.
Normally, most citizens will provide identification. These are the
people who break the law only occasionally and generally through
inadvertence and then mainly offences under The Highway Traffic Act.
By identifying themselves they leave themselves open to a charge, yet
in many instances these are the very people on whose behalf the
36 Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 110.
37 The Police Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 298, s. 47, as set out at p. 179 supra.
38 [1955] 3 All E.R. 406.
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police exercise their administrative discretion and simply give a
warning.
On the other hand, those who stand on their rights are frequently
chronic offenders, but because they have found a means of getting
around the law, use it to their advantage. These are the people,
particularly in relation to traffic violations, the police feel should be
charged. In many instances their driving habits are such that a
warning would not be sufficient.
These persons according to police are a minority. If this is so,
and they continue to stand on their rights in order to circumvent
laws developed for the benefit of the entire populace then perhaps a
charge of obstruction would not be too harsh in the circumstances.
Although this Part has essentially dealt with powers to arrest, a
closely related problem should be considered: the power to effect a
search. This will be accorded only superficial treatment because most
searches are effected under a warrant issued by a Justice of the Peace.
Consequently, it is similar to arrests with a warrant, the officer being
an agent of the court. It might be well to point out that late in 1965
the use of blanket warrants to search39 was stopped and the warrants
then in existance were recalled.
A constable's power to search is defined by statute. The Criminal
Code4o makes provision for searching a person for firearms. The most
extensive power to search is contained in The Liquor Control Act.
41
Section 110(1) permits a constable to search without a warrant any
conveyance or vehicle in which he believes, on reasonable and probable
grounds, liquor is unlawfully kept or had. Buildings may only be
searched with a warrant.4 2
Based on my experience, and also conversations with police
officers, most officers stay within the powers given to them. Only in
rare circumstances will this power be exceeded, primarily because
excesses are very easily proven, thus leaving the officer open to attack.
In only one situation is this power to search occasionally exceeded
and this is when an officer believes that a vehicle contains stolen goods.
In these circumstances, rather than obtain a warrant, he will rely on
the provisions of The Liquor Control Act in order to justify the
search: there is no provision for searching an automobile in relation
to theft of goods. An illustration here indicates the problem. Fre-
quently a large theft will take place in which an automobile was
39 These were issued by the Attorney-General's office to the Ontario
Provincial Police. Authority for their issuance was contained in The Liquor
Control Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 217, s. 110, ss. 3. This section was repealed by S.O.
1965, c. 58, s. 68, and a new section substituted therefor. The new section
does not contain authority for the issuance of such warrants. These were
similar to Writs of Assistance used by the R.C.M.P. inasmuch as they were
issued under statutory authorities and related to a specific item i.e., liquor.
40 Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 96.
41 R.S.O. 1960, c. 217, s. 110(1), as amended by S.O. 1961.62, c. 72, s. 5 is
repealed and s. 110 substituted by S.O. 1965, c. 58, s. 68.
42 Ibid., ss. 2.
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involved, for example, a gold robbery. Normal practice in such cir-
cumstances is to set up road blocks to attempt to locate the persons
involved. To effect a search of vehicles the officers have to rely on
the provisions of The Liquor Control Act to give their action some
semblance of legality. This is one area in which the possibility of
statutory power to search should be considered.
Suppose in the above illustration gold actually was located. A
strong argument could be presented that this evidence was illegally
obtained. This would not necessarily hinder a court in allowing such
evidence to be introduced and the reasons for the court exercising its
discretion in this matter is well set out in the following passage from
Wigmore:
The fact that a piece of evidence was obtained by some violation of law
was (until very modern times) never regarded as a ground for excluding
it. The judge and jury seek to get at the truth in the case in hand, and
all relevant evidence is needed. If any illegality has been dohe in obtain-
ing it, the remedy and the penalty can be enforced in another proceeding.
To obstruct the truth in the present case for the sake of punishing
indirectly a person who can readily be punished in a separate proceeding
does not seem reasonable or practical.43
With this statement the writer has no argument from a strictly
legal point of view. Philosophically, however, I feel it detracts from
the whole concept of law as we generally regard it. It is placing a
police officer in an invidious position. Although he is expected to
maintain the law, if he breaks it the court will allow the evidence so
acquired to be admitted. Clearly powers to search should be estab-
lished by statute. Beyond this, illegally obtained evidence should be
rejected.
This concludes the consideration of the major areas where
problems exist in administration. I have attempted here simply to
set out the legal rules; the next Part will consider how they are in
fact applied, from a practical point of view.
IV. Theory v. Practicability
In the foregoing Parts an attempt has been made to present a
brief summary of the law as it presently stands. This Part will be
concerned with the realities of applying that law, and, a consideration
of whether what should be done is in fact done. To some extent those
considerations are based on the past experience of the writer, but
chiefly on conversations with police officers actively engaged in en-
forcing the law.44
In the illustration presented in Part I, considered in light of what
is actually the law, if no confession had been extracted from the
accused youth, the officers could have been subject to an action for
43 Wigmore, Law of Evidence (1935) p. 341.
44 Twelve officers were interviewed, excluding those of official level who
are engaged in administrative matters only. The twelve ranged in age from
22 to 47 and ranked from Constable to Detective Sergeant. Length of service
averaged approximately 10 years, ranging from a minimum of two to a maxi.
mum of twenty-two.
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false arrest or imprisonment. Would this same course of action be
taken today? All that can be said in answer to such a question is
that it might be taken. Police departments have been under such
severe criticism for infringement of civil liberties that most officers
are aware of the shaky ground they are entering upon in effecting an
arrest in such circumstances. It would probably depend on the zeal
of the particular officers involved.
The tactics employed to extract the confession are still used
today, with variations, depending upon the particular circumstances.
Whether it was obtained without fear or favour and thus voluntarily,
will not be considered here. It is simply pointed out that in many
cases, and this is particularly true when the suspect is not versed in
the law, various tactics are used to extract a confession. These tactics
would have little effect on professional type criminals because they
are well aware of their legal right not to say anything.
As an aside, I should like to dispel a popular misconception of
police officers and that is in relation to beatings inflicted on suspects.
In my experience I was never present nor was I aware of any assaults
committed on a suspect or accused while in police offices or jails. It is
not denied that in some instances suspects have been assaulted both
in the course of an investigation or while arrests were being effected.
Most of these situations can be directly linked with the officer losing
his temper. This is aptly illustrated by the following example related
by a senior police official.
In the course of an investigation, an officer had occasion to
question a suspect whom the officer had previously charged with
several traffic violations. The suspect used some very common four
and five letter epithets to indicate his sentiments regarding police.
This kept up until the officer lost his temper and struck the suspect.
Subsequently, when rationality returned, the officer laid a charge
against the suspect in order to protect himself from a civil action.
The charge was later dismissed. In another situation, an officer was
questioning a suspect and was told to get off his (the suspect's) back
or he would visit the officer's wife while he was on duty. As in the
former situation, the suspect was assaulted.
In neither of these circumstances would a court rule other than
that it was assault, for in both cases it was precisely that. In this
context it is well to illustrate the difficulty of appreciating other
people's problems from a completely objective viewpoint. Lawyers
view our system of justice as the adversary system. A police officer
would be more inclined to view it as a discourse between two exceed-
ingly restrained gentlemen (opposing counsel). Applying the ad-
versary system as a police officer knows it from day to day experience
to the opposing counsel would, I hazard the opinion, reduce many a
courtroom into shambles within minutes.
It is not suggested that such assaults are in any way justified,
but simply that there is a limit to what anyone can be subjected to.
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In the course of a day's work a policeman is frequently subjected to
all kinds of frustrations; derogatory remarks, epithets, and on occa-
sion, informed that he will be fired. It is inevitable that at some
point in his career these will culminate in an assault on someone. In
view of my own experience, it constantly surprises me it does not
happen more frequently.
Returning to the confession, it was the only evidence on which a
charge could be founded. The confession did not even disclose a source
of independent evidence. Any charge laid had to stand or fall on
the strength of the confession alone. There was no doubt as to the
veracity of the statements obtained from the various youths. All
statements, taken separately, were consistent with one another and
also with the facts. It was not a case where someone was simply
trying to obtain publicity. The question of guilt was thus not in doubt.
This illustration is far from unrepresentative of typical confes-
sion situations. The argument for maintaining such tactics is that
society is better served by apprehending the vandals and bringing
them to justice. The fact that somewhat colourable tactics were used
is justified because otherwise there would be no way of effecting such
apprehension. Proponents of civil liberties on the other hand could
argue that the rights of the suspect were violated. To be more precise,
the accused should have had benefit of counsel and they in turn would
probably have advised the boys to say nothing. This, then, is the core
of the problem, apprehension of criminals, or a strict application of
the civil liberties approach and consequent freedom for guilty parties.
The problem appears virtually insoluble.
In the foregoing, it was suggested that accused had the right to
counsel's advice. This problem was ably canvassed by Patrick Galli-
gan45 who concluded the right did exist.
It would therefore appear to be clear that an arrested person is entitled
to have legal advice without delay and any attempt to prevent it Is to
be censured by the courts.46
This conclusion was arrived at by considering the Bill of Rights,47
judicial pronouncements in the Koechlin case,48 and unreported rea-
sons in a judicial inquiry into the arrest of Robert Wright and
Michael Griffin. 49 The last paragraph of Mr. Justice Roach's reasons
is here reproduced because it formed a principal point in Mr. Galligan's
discussion.
The lawyer is an officer of the court and it is the function of the courts
to administer justice according to law. To prevent an officer of the court
from conferring with the prisoner who in due course may appear before
it, violates a right of the prisoner which is fundamental to our system
for the administration of justice.5 0
45 Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures, 1963, pp. 35-37.
46 Ibid., at p. 37.
47 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 2.
48 Supra, footnote 29.
49 Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures, 1963, p. 55 et seq.
50 Ibid., at p. 57.
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In our illustration, assuming the boy was arrested at his home,
when does this right to counsel arise? Is it when the police decide
they have a valid basis for a charge? Is it when he was first arrested?
If the latter is the proper point in time, then assuming most lawyers
would advise their clients to say nothing, no basis for a charge could
have been established. If the former is the proper time, the con-
fession would have been obtained by them anyway.
Furthermore, if the lawyer is an officer of the court, and the
accused's right to counsel exists as of his arrest, what happens if the
accused informs his counsel that he committed the offence? Should
counsel follow usual procedure and advise him to say nothing? Would
this not place the lawyer in the position of a court officer suppressing
evidence? Or should he advise his client to confess? The preceding
questions indicate some of the problems which could arise if suspects
were entitled to counsel at the investigative level.
With deference to Mr. Justice Roach's reason and Mr. Galligan's
statement, I suggest adequate protection is already provided by The
Criminal Code.51 A person who has been arrested with or without a
warrant by a peace officer should be brought before a justice within
twenty-four hours, if available, and if not available, as soon as
possible.
I do not in any way question the right to counsel in the interval
between the accused's appearance before a justice and the commence-
ment of trial. In practice, both these may be co-terminus in point of
time and in these circumstances, counsel should be permitted to see
his client before the actual laying of the charge. The lawyer's function
is to ensure his client's interests are best served within the adversary
system and that his case is presented fairly and impartially. To do
so, it is obvious he must be able to contact his client before trial, for
otherwise the lawyer is in an unfavourable position.
Unfortunately, at trial, none of the boys in our illustration had
the benefit of counsel. If they had, and the statements had been
ruled inadmissible, the charges then would have been dismissed. Here
the lawyer would have been fulfilling his proper function, assuring a
fair trial within the adversary system. Financial circumstances were
the principal reason why none of the boys were represented and in
this respect, proposals for legal aid in Ontario are valuable.
The contention that adequate safeguards are built into this area
of the law is reinforced by the fact that a person is assumed to know
the law. If this is so, then a suspect should know that he does not
have to say anything. Unfortunately, although this assumption exists,
the only people who are aware that they do not have to say anything
are those most aware of the law because of past experience, i.e.
rounders.
52
51 Criminal Code, s. 438(2) (a) and (b).
52 A term used to indicate, as nearly as the writer can ascertain, persons
who derive their income solely from crime.
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In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled:
Where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect
has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process ofinterrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the
suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with
his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absoluteconstitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the
Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment" and that no statement elicited by the police during the
interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.53
It should be observed this case was decided on the basis of con-
stitutional guarantees, which grounds, in view of the status of our
Canadian Bill of Rights, are not open to our courts. Assuming for
the moment that such a ruling was open to our courts, what would
be the practical result?
For an answer to the question posed, police officers at both the
senior official level and those actively engaged in apprehending crimin-
als were queried as to their reaction. Two very extreme views were
presented. One officer stated quite emphatically:
To hell with it! If such a decision were rendered here I would simply
take a year round vacation with pay.
His attitude at first glance appears extreme to say the least, but in
this context I refer to an article in Life Magazine. 54 This article, I
was informed by all police officers contacted, was a very accurate
reflection of their problem and feelings.
This urge to play it safe, not to get involved, not to enforce the law,
has had a long, gradual genesis. In the past few years Supreme Court
decisions concerning search, seizure of evidence, arrest, and prisoner
interrogation have created an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty
among the police. Not sure what they can legally do, the police have
frequently responded by doing nothing.
At the opposite extreme, other officers expressed the opinion that
it would not make much difference if such confessions were excluded.
One in particular said that a confession was a poor basis for a charge,
not only because it may have been given to attract publicity, but also
because it might never be admitted. Even if it were admitted usually
its value does not equal the time and problems involved. He stated it
more precisely in poetic form:
I would rather sit around my house with a cold beer, than spend all day
in court in a voir dire.
The officer further stated, that although many statements would
be rendered inadmissible if the Escobedo ruling were law, confessions
would still have value for police purposes inasmuch as they frequently
53 Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U.S. 478.
54 Life, December 3, 1965, at p. 115.
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provide other evidence on which to found a charge,"5 for example,
facts are elicited which were previously unknown. Thus the incentive
to extract confessions would still be present.
It would appear therefore that an Escobedo-type ruling probably
would not affect police procedure to any great extent. Police would
probably continue their present practice, even though a confession
resulting from it would not be admissible, in the hope that other
evidence could be turned up. Although only the two extremes of
opinion were indicated above, the majority of the officers interviewed
favoured the latter.
Earlier we considered the situation where a police officer came
upon a suspect in a laneway. It is now an appropriate time to consider
what action would be taken. Of twelve officers interviewed, twelve
said they would in all probability arrest him, depending upon the
circumstances. Unfortunately, if the suspect had a plausible answer,
these officers would have placed themselves in a difficult position.
Now every officer qualified his answer with the statement 'depend-
ing on the circumstances'. Circumstances in this instance are usually
factors that do not constitute evidence as a lawyer considers it. How
does one prove the facial expression and mannerisms of a suspect?
How do you prove an antagonistic attitude? How do you prove that
the officer was told by an informant that the store was going to be
'made'? These are the circumstances adverted to and on which a police
officer will usually make up his mind whether to arrest or not to
arrest. His decision must be instantaneous; he does not have the
benefit of hindsight which we as lawyers instituting the civil action
against the officer have.
Another circumstance that will influence the officer's decision is
the matter of external and internal pressure. By this is meant, pres-
sure from within and without the police department to assure that
police action is taken. Frequently, and I can assure you if statistics
were available the public would be shocked as to how much, the
officer will simply exercise an administrative discretion and forget it
when confronted with an offence.
In the illustration of the youths, this probably would have been
the course adopted for two reasons. The service club, the complainant,
was actively engaged in helping boys of this very nature. It was
repugnant to their avowed policy of assistance to want to see youths
prosecuted. Secondly, what worthwhile benefit was obtained by
registering a conviction in the circumstances? The father of one of the
boys was serving a term in Kingston Penitentiary. Two others were
from broken homes. Of all the parents, only the mother of the first
exhibited any interest. This stemmed from a fear that perhaps her son
was following in his father's footsteps. All these boys required help;
none required a conviction to carry with him for years.
55 This statement applies equally well to eavesdropping or wire tapping
techniques.
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The boys were brought to court and a conviction was registered.
This illustrated to the community that they had an efficient police
force. Efficient? It was simply a fortuitous circumstance, viz., contact
with an informant, that finally produced results. If one subscribes to
the deterrent theory, then a benefit was gained by the community.
Whether there is any merit in the concept of deterrence I leave to
those more qualified to decide.
Thus by laying charges, the external pressure exerted by the
community on the police department to effect an arrest was abated.
What about the internal pressure from the department itself?
How many times do you observe a traffic violation while driving
your automobile? I sincerely doubt if anyone could answer this ques-
tion negatively. Consider then if you were specially trained to detect
infractions, how many would be observed? Every officer is required
to keep a diary of his activities. What would happen if at the end
of a month he had recorded no violations of any kind? This would
indicate one of two things: either a total disregard for the duties
imposed on him, or a complete reformation of society. The latter can
be disregarded as being a totally naive approach to the question.
This problem was presented to the officers interviewed and all
argued that if no violation were recorded in a month, the officer
concerned would be at least reprimanded. Even if his average in
relation to others was low, he might still be in trouble. This problem
has an escalating effect; introducing a new recruit into the force is
analogous to employing a new salesman in a sales force. Once they
have gained sufficient experience, their enthusiasm will push up the
averages. Slowly, however the new recruit realizes that his exuberance
is working against him. He seizes a bottle of beer and has to fill out
twelve forms in reporting it. If the party charged pleads not guilty,
the officer has to appear in court.56 Slowly he becomes overwhelmed
with paper work and court appearances. Then he decides to exercise
his administrative discretion and starts handing out warnings. At
this point he will try to assess just how many violations are required
to keep him in good standing with his superior and will work on this
basis..
I am not suggesting, nor am I aware of any requirement that a
given number of convictions or prosecutions have to be instituted in
a given time period. What I am suggesting is that from a practical
point of view it would be illogical if there were not some. This applies
not only to traffic and liquor offences. Officers engaged in specialized
fields such as 'break and enter' divisions are subject to the same
problem. They are the first on the scene of all offences of such nature
and records are kept of the ratio of convictions to offences reported.
56 On the Ontario Provincial Police those working night shifts are allowed
to accumulate time for court appearances and take it as days off. Some police
departments pay overtime for such appearances. I understand this procedure
is followed by the Metro Police Force.
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Returning once more to the directive issued by the Attorney-
General's office, the substance of the directive was described to twelve
police officers and they were asked what action they would take in
the circumstances. Eleven said they would charge the person with
obstruction; one said he would seize the vehicle and arrest the driver
because it would be reasonable and probable grounds to believe that
the vehicle had been stolen.
In light of the directive, a magistrate's decision and attendant
publicity, plus the fact that both the Metro Toronto Police and the
Ontario Provincial Police teach recruits that an arrest cannot be made
in these circumstances, it would appear from the officers' statements
that something is clearly wrong. Either communications between
the various levels of police administration are bad, or the officers
intend to place their own interpretation on the law. I am inclined to
accept the former view and this is based largely on a consideration
of the educational facilities of the Ontario Provincial Police.
New recruits are given a three-week orientation course at Sher-
bourne Street College. The scope of this course is to teach a recruit
'what he must know before he starts work'. As one senior police
official put it, the emphasis is on 'must' and covers generally the
transition from a civilian to a police officer.
Subsequently he will go to Aylmer for two six-week courses
conducted about one year apart. In theory, the first course is to
commence six months after the recruit joins the force. In practice,
this has been extended to a minimum of eighteen months because of
the back-log at the Aylmer school.57 Following these courses, spe-
cialized training is offered in crime detection, finger-printing, etc., as
time and availability of competent officers permit.
There was, and still is, a saying in police departments to the
effect that 'there are more ex-policemen than policemen'. This is
indicative of the high turnover58 and this is particularly applicable
to the early stages of a police officer's career. Thus, in many instances,
a police officer has been subjected to only negligible amounts of train-
ing. Many, during their entire career as a police officer, in view of
the high turnover rate at the initial stage, have had little more than
three weeks training. Furthermore, those with longer service records
have only infrequently been subjected to advanced training which
would familiarize them with changes in the law. Although orders are
circulated, which would include items such as the Attorney-General's
directive, owing to the pressure of work, these are frequently given
only a superficial examination by the individual officers. Thus it is
not surprising, in light of these facts, that the officers reacted to the
Attorney-General's directive in the manner they did.
57 The writer was informed that as of March 1, 1966, the Aylmer School
should be in a position to adhere to the six month limits.
58 Statistics on this point could not be obtained due to increases in staff
in recent years thus distorting averages.
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V. Conclusion
From the foregoing Part it would appear the police 'will be
damned if they do and damned if they don't'. At the same time,
simply because the law is difficult of application is no reason to ride
roughshod over the rights of the individual. How then is balance to
be achieved between such divergent concepts as law enforcement and
civil liberties? The following suggestions are tendered.
First and foremost is more comprehensive police training. Train-
ing in this context is given an extended meaning. It would embrace not
only the actual application of law but also a broader education of
police to the role they are to fulfill in a democratic society. Conse-
quently the police officer should be subjected to University level
subjects such as sociology, psychology and political science to name
but a few. The reasons for suggesting these are because police officers
tend to lose their perspective over a period of time. They begin to
regard all of society as either a law breaker or at least a potential one.
This is only natural inasmuch as most of a police officer's working
day is concerned with this type of individual.
Next, to be considered is comprehensive survey of the whole
field regarding the balance between police power and civil liberties.
Not only should legislators and lawyers be represented, but the police
as well. Only then can a complete purview of the whole problem be
made.
Thirdly, the results of such inquiry should be clearly set out in
statutory form, binding on police and citizens alike. Once clearly
defined, constables should again be personally liable for torts com-
mitted outside the scope of their authority. It is one thing to say in
court that everyone is assumed to know the law and proving that in
fact they do know the law. It has been indicated above that police
clearly do not, and there is serious doubt whether their civilian
counterparts are even as well informed. This assumption should be
disregarded and an active campaign conducted to familiarize everyone
with his rights and duties.
Because suggestions must of necessity be general in scope, the
urgency of reform should not be underestimated. To point out the
urgency, one officer, when asked his opinion concerning the Escobedo
decision, said that such a ruling could only result in some murderers
ending up in back alleys. Justice at the end of a .38 revolver rather
than a court of law! At first glance this appears to be extreme. I
assure you it is not. From my own experience, a police officer wanted
a prisoner accused of a particularly heinous sex crime involving young
girls to escape so he could shoot him for fleeing lawful custody.59
Reasoning by others prevailed and he desisted.
In a recent conversation with a known criminal in Toronto, I
asked him to what extent organized crime existed in the area. His
59 Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 25.
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response was that although the Toronto Police might be lax in some
matters, in this respect their efficiency was unequalled by any force
on the continent. Considering the fact that he has spent much of his
adult life in prisons both here and in the United States, he was qualified
to express an opinion.
For this we can be proud; for our democratic tradition also we
can be proud. The fact that the task appears monumental is no reason
for neglecting to introduce much needed reforms in this area of the
law, both for the preservation of our democracy, but also the law
enforcement necessary to maintain it.
Liberty does not consist in having your house robbed by organized groups
of thieves.60
60 Sir Robert Peel.
